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A celebratory conference of this kind should allow the keynote lecture to be 
somewhat more personal than normal. It is with that in mind that I have linked 
the theme, 'Southeast Asia: Past, Present and Future', to the person whose 
birthday we are celebrating. I do not know if I can do that successfully but 
will try by pursuing some of Nick's [Nicholas Tarling] and my own life and 
professional experiences with imperial themes in Southeast Asian history. Why 
'imperial themes'? Would not that be too much of a bias towards the past? It 
would seem to ignore the conference theme to include both the present and the 
future. Of course, I have an historian's weakness for what is past; in this case, 
even 'privileging' a past paradigm that Southeast Asians today might prefer to 
forget. My excuse is that the party is for Nick, who is even more the historian 
than I am, and this is a rare opportunity for me to connect with him in the 
Southeast Asian context. But I shall not only talk about the past. I also hope to 
show that there are imperial themes in different contexts and different kinds of 
empires. Many of us wish to see the end of empires forever, and indeed some 
kinds of empires may have come to an end. But imperial themes are pervasive 
and resilient and may be more present than we think, and more relevant for 
the future than we would want. I recall suggesting a few months ago, when 
commemorating the end of the Second World War in Asia, that the kind of 
empire that the Japanese had tried to establish in Southeast Asia between 1941 
and 1945 was gone and never to return. My audience thought that was wishful 
thinking and pointed out other imperial possibilities that might be subtler but 
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no less imperial. I agree, though I still think that the old-style territorial empire 
that the Japanese tried to create will not be repeated. Indeed, the word empire 
is used today for many things: not only political entities but also business, 
financial, media and cultural empires and there are vague but cognate concepts 
in words like neocolonialism and neo-imperialism. I do not, however, wish to 
get into those areas in this lecture, but will concentrate on empires that project 
political power and influence.
Nick is a son of the British Empire while my father was born just before 
the collapse of the Manchu Qing Empire, both once powerful albeit in quite 
contrasting ways. However, I grew up in Malaya as a subject of Britain's 
global outreach, so there are some differences and similarities in Nick's and 
my perspectives. Thus, in approaching the topic of imperial themes, I shall 
begin with some reflections drawn from our two life experiences of empire 
from the centre and from the edges. After that, I shall explore three sets of 
changes and talk about, viz. empires becoming colonies, empires becoming 
nations, and finally, nations becoming empires. I shall then end with some 
reflections on future imperial themes.
Let me begin with the two of us finding ourselves in Southeast Asia. 
Nick started as an historian when the modern British Empire was still actively 
transforming itself into a commonwealth of nations. Britain was in the midst 
of orchestrating the establishment of a new class of sovereign states that would 
be friendly to their former imperial master. Nick would have studied in school 
the formative years of that empire, and probably a fair amount about the 
classical Athenian, Persian and Roman empires. Along the way, he was likely 
to have compared British imperial progress with those of Britain's rivals. I 
do not know how much of a classical scholar he was in school. If he were 
one, the rhetoric of the Roman Empire at its height would have shaped the 
language and imagination of the budding historian. Also, I know how much 
Nick loves the theatre. If that love had come early, then I would expect him 
to have absorbed the imperial cadences in Shakespeare's powerful words (and 
the images they conjured), from plays that I had also read such as Henry V, 
Julius Caesar, and Anthony and Cleopatra. When I think of Nick having done 
all that before he first stepped into the British archives, I can see why he is 
such a dedicated historian. I even wondered had he been born earlier, whether 
he would been content to be an historian of empire, whether he would not have 
been an empire-builder himself. Why act on a stage when you might have 
been, if not a Stamford Raffles or James Brooke or Frank Swettenham, at least 
George Orwell or Leonard Woolf? Nick, in any case, came on the swelling 
scene in time. He studied with Victor Purcell at Cambridge, and Purcell would 
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have provided him with a rich personal perspective of the British Empire in 
multi-communal Malaya / Malaysia, when the last generation of imperial 
officials staged one final dramatic effort at state building in Southeast Asia.
In comparison, my imperial experiences were somewhat miscellaneous. 
I was born in the Netherlands Empire in the East Indies and grew up in Perak 
when it was a British quasi-sovereign protectorate (as a schoolboy, I always 
wondered what was being protected, British imperial interests or a nominal 
Malay sovereignty). Then there was an interlude during which I encountered 
the Japanese empire. Perhaps it was not typical of all empires at war, but I 
learnt from those three and a half years how bad empires could really be if 
they tried, and also how short-lived some empires could be. When that ended 
in 1945, the British returned, not quite in a blaze of glory, but they showed 
us how adaptable and resilient they were by setting out to re-invent what they 
would have to leave behind. I was never sure that we were being 'de-colonized' 
it felt more like we were 'de-imperialized'. Hence I had a second dose, this 
time of a chastened imperial power divesting itself of the burden if not the 
memory of empire.
Thus my education was a mixed bag, and even the imperial themes of 
my youth were contradictory. The only constant was that I was directed by 
what I was taught and what I lived through to question the glories of empire 
and ultimately welcome the end of empires. For example, the only history I 
remember learning in school was that of the British Empire, taught out of a 
very dull textbook by a teacher who was dutiful but obviously bored. The only 
correctives for me came from two sources. One was the Chinese classics that 
my father taught me during the Japanese occupation that introduced me to 
some notions of an ancient empire in China. The other was from the stories I 
heard from my Malay friends in school about the Malacca Empire from which 
the state of Perak claims to have been descended. Thus I was not in any way 
prepared for the serious study of history and the thought of being an historian 
never occurred to me.
When I first met Nick, he was in the enviable position of having direct 
access to the rich archives that all historians dream of. He had just started then 
but, as we all know, he has over the past 50 years made excellent use of these 
archives in the most systematic way. This was a great time for the imperial 
historians of Western Europe. There was a closure. The story, after centuries 
of splendid as well as dubious beginnings, now had an ending. The five acts 
were all there, the bodies could now be counted and the historian was ready 
to step up to say his piece as the curtain came down. In this case, he was free 
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to analyze pithily the great and foul deeds or to draw a moral lesson for our 
times.
My fate was different. My generation in British Malaya was being 
prepared to face a new beginning, a nation-state modeled on those in Europe 
but, unlike them, given universal suffrage from the start, with our multiple 
communities filled with great hopes and even greater anxieties. Malaya was 
to be an example of what Rupert Emerson called the process 'from empire to 
nation'. But before I confronted that process, I had gone to China to study in 
the National Central University at the capital of a dying regime, the Nationalist 
government of Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi, 1887-1975]. I was witness to 
a recently failed empire that was also a failed state still struggling to build 
a nation. In order to avoid being caught in the civil war that the Chinese 
Communist Party was to win, I returned to Malaya. The new Federation was 
then in the midst of a communist insurgency that challenged the kind of state 
that the British wanted to set up. At its climax, this had led to the killing of the 
British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney [1948-51]. Despite that, I was 
introduced to a hopeful experiment, to British ingenuity busily nation-building 
on the foundations of a colonial state. At the University of Malaya, then in 
Singapore, I was fortunate to study with two remarkable historians. One was 
the historian of British India, Eric Stokes, who probed the underpinnings of the 
ideas behind Victorian imperialism. The other was Cyril Northcote Parkinson, 
the naval historian, who traced the decisive factors in British trading power 
that led them to Singapore and the opening of the China market. However, 
my taste for British imperial history had been killed at school. So I chose a 
different tack. My stay in Nanjing had drawn me to a puzzling question, why 
did the Chinese empire not simply become a nation-state in the first half of the 
twentieth century? So I began to study that generation in China who helped to 
abolish the ancient empire and got it to re-name itself a republic. Not only did 
this empire fail to become a united nation, but the nascent republic was also 
dogged by civil wars and foreign invasions. As a result, only a small part of 
its records were preserved and what survived in its divided archives was not 
open. Furthermore with the communist victory in China in 1949 and the anti-
communist war in Malaya, it became impossible for me to study modern China 
without being suspected of harbouring 'terrorist' sympathies. By this time, I 
was determined to be a student of history, so I chose to examine the nature of 
the ancient Chinese empire instead, with an eye on the relations of that empire 
with Southeast Asia. Thus Nick and I, coming from different directions and 
looking at different time-scales, came to meet in Southeast Asia.
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EMPIRES BEcOMINg cOLONIES
Let me now turn to my first point about empires becoming colonies. Neither 
of us, however, did research on the native empires of the region. We studied 
empires that had strong state foundations elsewhere whose origins and 
trajectories of growth were quite different. Nick's world was global with many 
nation-state protagonists each capable of reaching out faster and further than 
before. By the end of the eighteenth century, the British East India Company 
had consolidated its trading empire beginnings and was on the verge of 
transforming itself into a national empire built on industrial capital. As for me, 
I looked at a continental Chinese empire that consistently turned landwards. 
Even though it never lost its trading links with Southeast Asian ports, the 
Confucian state did not encourage state-to-state relations. It chose instead to 
slot Southeast Asian polities loosely into a tributary system that was originally 
invented for China's own internal use and thus kept the relationship somewhat 
feudal between rulers. All the same, both Nick and I were aware that there 
were native imperial themes at work in the region and followed the work 
of our colleagues with great interest, notably historians like Georges Coedes 
and Oliver Wolters on the Hindu-Buddhist states, scholars who did so much 
to stretch our imaginations about the imperial functions that these states 
performed. It was not a coincidence that we both concentrated on maritime 
Southeast Asia. This was the easternmost part of the British Asia that Nick 
focused on. I, of course, was born and grew up in the middle of that Malay 
world.
You may have noticed that I have used the word empire for very different 
kinds of states and that I was careful not to use its twin, the word imperialism. 
In fact, the definitions of empire are many because there have been so many 
empires in history but many of them could not be said to have been imperialist. 
Historians and political scientists have argued endlessly about what is common 
to all of them. For example, what do the ancient empires of India, China and 
Persia have in common with the modern British, Dutch and Japanese empires 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? I shall come to that later. What 
about those empires in pre-modern Southeast Asia? The word empire has been 
used readily in our history texts today for the Angkor (or Zhenla-Khmer) and 
the Siamese empires on the mainland and Sri Vijaya, Majapahit and Malacca 
empires in the archipelago. One might add Vietnam if only because it is a 
reminder how elastic the term empire can be. There were empires to which 
other states paid tribute while they in turn offered tribute to the larger Chinese 
empire.
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I must admit I knew little about the local imperial polities before I went 
to university. I should have known more about Malacca. It was the closest 
both in geography and in spirit to the state of Perak where I went to school, but 
most non-Malays of my generation knew less about that empire than about the 
Portuguese capture of its capital in 1511. It took me years to understand the 
significance of Malacca's links with the empire of Sri Vijaya and its relations 
with the imperial states of Java, Siam and Ming China, and even longer to 
realize that, as empires, all these were very different from one another. I need 
hardly say that the European and Japanese empires that I had personally lived 
under were not at all like any of those mentioned.
As we know, parts of these empires ended up as examples of European 
colonies. But what do words like empire and colony mean here, especially 
when they are juxtaposed? If what the Portuguese strung together in the 
sixteenth century across wide expanses of ocean was an empire, and similarly 
what the Dutch did the next century was another empire, what does it mean 
to say that Malacca was a Portuguese colony and Batavia a Dutch colony? In 
fact, the Malay and Javanese empires did not disappear. The names changed 
and their centres moved but the traditions, the claims, the aspirations, and 
even the core elites, could trace their roots back to the same imperial origins. 
In a tradition that emphasized a mobile core, one empire's centre could 
become another empire's periphery and be regarded as the latter empire's 
domain. When threatened or defeated, new imperial centres could be found, 
established and defended afresh. Thus the empires of the archipelago had their 
own characteristics. Wolters decided to give them a special name. Inspired 
by the stories of several Sri Vijayan capitals that were precursors of the later 
Malay capitals, both on the peninsula and widespread across the Java Sea, he 
turned away from conventional references to vassal and satellite polities, and 
drew analogies with the concept of the mandala polities of South Asia. His 
analyses were most enlightening, but nothing could detract from the fact that 
the overarching frame was imperial, even if uniquely so.
This is not the place to debate the semantics of empire. My focus is 
on imperial themes. For maritime Southeast Asia, the theme was that of 
imperial mobility made necessary by weak state structures. A system of 
portable institutions was feasible because they were built on maritime trade. 
Such institutions appeared soft and plastic but they were stuck onto lightly 
assembled and resilient frames. In that way, people, genealogy and economic 
performance were more important than location and longevity. The loss of a 
port-city was replaceable, and sacred sites could be re-consecrated elsewhere. 
Clearly this was not the norm when compared with the larger and more stable 
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empires of the period, but its strategy of survival persisted through the early 
centuries of European expansion from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries.
The land-based empires on the mainland did not support this form 
of imperial agility. The Hindu-Buddhist Khmers and the Sailendras in Java 
did move their centres from time to time, but their monuments were more 
grandiose and permanent and had to be fiercely defended. Similarly, the 
Vietnamese came south and took the lands of the Cham rulers, and employed 
the highly structured model of the Chinese. They too settled for imperial 
grandeur. As for the empires that succeeded the Khmers and the Mons on the 
Menam and Irrawaddy valleys, the Siamese and later the Burmese did no less 
to fortify each new city as they expanded their respective realms. They were 
thus less vulnerable to the modern maritime powers that came from the West 
who, in any case, got enough of what they wanted from the Malay networks 
of the archipelago. The mainland empires were not challenged for over 200 
years. Only a new kind of empire would want to try to breach their walls. This 
was eventually developed in Europe by the British and the French during the 
nineteenth century, the product of high industrial capitalism. And it needed 
their brand of overwhelming power to turn these native empires, with the 
exception of Siam, into what was to be called colonies, in these cases, really 
subjugated states.
EMPIRES BEcOMINg NATIONS
This takes me to the second idea of empires becoming nations. I lived through 
the years of global decolonization and observed the process of turning former 
parts of empires into new nation-states. Nick's work on Britain's efforts to 
de-colonize while seeking to retain residual influence as long as possible 
was exemplary in reinforcing the image of orderly imperial retreat. I was so 
impressed by British success compared to Dutch failures in Indonesia and 
the French disasters in Indochina that I took for granted that that was the 
ideal way for empires to disband. More than that, the British Empire withdrew 
to become the Commonwealth of Nations. Despite adopting the broader 
Commonwealth name, Britain remained but a nationstate. Thus empires not 
only spawned nation-states but could also return to being one again. I found 
this intriguing because it was clear that this did not apply to empires that 
had never been nation-states in the first place. I was thinking of the China 
that I was trying to study. Sun Yat-sen [Sun Zhong Shan, 1867-1925] and his 
Nationalist Party thought they could take off their imperial coats and raise the 
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republican colours, and thus make China a new nation-state. What they did not 
expect was that the national empires that impinged on China's sovereignty at 
the time saw China as a dying empire that could be reduced to several nation-
states. By their definitions, there was 'China Proper' and there were the others 
that all qualified to be nation-states by right. Certainly, unlike the maritime 
empires, adjacent territories on the edges of empire were more difficult to 
detach. Britain looking north from India and Russia looking south from Siberia 
challenged each other to do just that and the stalemate between them helped to 
save territories like Tibet and Xinjiang from being removed from China. And 
between French and British competing interests, most of the original province 
of Yunnan stayed within Chinese borders. In that context, the Russians did help 
establish the Mongolian republic and the Japanese colonization of Taiwan has 
left a separation that haunts China still. On the other hand, the rival ambitions 
of the Russians and the Japanese prevented China from losing the provinces 
of Manchuria permanently.
As it happened, it had not been possible for me to do research on modern 
China in Malaysia. So I looked at the Chinese empire in its trade with the 
Southeast Asian ports of the South China Sea. They led me to the origins of the 
tributary system devised for a tianxia, or 'All Under Heaven', that John King 
Fairbank called 'the Chinese world order'. This new term suggests that, by the 
criteria that defined empires in European history, China was not quite the kind 
of empire they were familiar with. All the same, as shorthand, everyone used 
the word empire for China until 1911. What is interesting is that, long after 
1911, the shadow of empire still seems to follow China around. No matter that, 
officially, all countries recognize China as a large multi-nation state and accept 
its international borders, and it has been easy for regions like Southeast Asia to 
be pointed to as targets of a future 'China threat' because of its imperial past.
It is true that the Qin-Han Empire advanced into the Red River valleys 
of northern Vietnam over 2000 years ago and stayed over 1000 years. It is 
true that, for some 600 years, the kingdom of Dali and the tribal statelets of 
Guizhou and Yunnan were gradually incorporated into Ming and Qing imperial 
provinces. It is also true that vague terms like feudal and tributary relations, 
vassalage and suzerainty, left us unclear whether they might be used again in 
future relationships. I had gone on to study North China during the late Tang 
and Song dynasties, covering a period when the Chinese empire was weak 
and divided. This was when Chinese emperors paid tribute to other emperors 
stronger than themselves. My study led me to examine other manifestations of 
IJAPS, Vol. 13, No. 2, 179–192, 2017 Wang Gungwu
187
empire in Asia. For example, the Mongol conquest of China under the Yuan 
dynasty led to aggressive activity in Southeast Asia, including the invasion 
of Burma, Vietnam, Champa and Java (and Korea and Japan as well). The 
climax of these actions came after the Mongols were driven out when the 
Ming emperor Yongle [1402-24] sent the eunuch admiral Zheng He [Cheng 
Ho, 1371 / 1375-1433 / 1435] on naval expeditions to the Indian Ocean and 
the coast of East Africa. (I suggest that you do not trouble yourselves with the 
unfounded claims that his ships visited New Zealand!) I studied the reasons 
for Emperor Yongle's fleets to travel to and through Southeast Asia and it 
was clear that he had extended the tributary system across the oceans in an 
unprecedented way. The decision, however, was his and, after his death, there 
was no sustained interest in maritime affairs or in political relations. There 
remained some official trade with Southeast Asian kingdoms, but the only 
naval forces left were maintained to fight piracy on the Chinese coasts and, 
under the Manchu Qing rulers, to capture Taiwan from the Ming loyalists 
there.
This imperial theme touched the region lightly and surfaced from time 
to time, most notably when armed Chinese and Japanese trading consortia 
under Zheng Chenggong [Koxinga, 1624-62] and his father had threatened the 
empire during the Ming-Qing transition of the seventeenth century. After that, 
China passively accepted that several Southeast Asian ports were garrisoned 
by Europeans and was content to limit or deny these traders any rights in 
Chinese ports themselves. The lights of empire began to dim for China by 
the end of the eighteenth century although the mandarins were still unaware 
of the power shifts the British had made in the region. Yet it remained an 
empire where Manchu invaders ruled over the Han majority and the idea of 
nationhood, as we understand it, was not much more than a strong sense of 
multiple local Han ethnicities. Thus I came to understand how difficult it was 
for an empire to become a nation-state if it was never one in the first place. From 
that point of view, imperial Britain's experiments at nation building, however 
imperfect they have been, provided a far stronger base for nationhood than 
anything imperial China could have done for its own peoples. But, now that 
the Chinese are embarked on their nation building tasks, will they understand 
what it means to be a mere nation-state? Will they be content to be that or 
will they learn from Europe and Japan that nations could be aggrandized to 
become empires?
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NATIONS BEcOMINg EMPIRES
Let me now turn to how nations became empires and look at the changing 
imperial themes brought by the Europeans to Southeast Asia. The earlier 
empires were primarily trading ventures initiated by kings or merchants before 
the age of nation-states. This was certainly true of the Dutch and English East 
India companies that competed aggressively in the archipelago. Each went on 
to take imperial shape and evolved imperial characteristics over a couple of 
centuries. Before the Dutch and the English, the Portuguese and Spanish did 
have missions that could be traced to deeper medieval roots. The Portuguese 
proclaimed to have come to the East in search of 'Christians and gold', and 
this was also the understanding of the Spanish crown. This mission survived 
from the spirit of the Crusades, an outreach of the struggles over trade and 
the Holy Land. It gave the Spanish settlements in the Philippine islands a 
distinctive imperial theme that the Portuguese tried less successfully to match 
in their small toeholds off the coasts of India, China and the Malay Peninsula. 
The side commitment to find Christians, however, remained and served as an 
ideological sub-text common also to the European peopling of the Americas. 
It carried an imperial theme that was pre-national but was both universal and 
enduring, and elements of this mission to bring the truth to less fortunate 
natives have survived till the present day.
By the eighteenth century in Southeast Asia, the trading roles of the 
Dutch and the English had become dominant. Gold was acknowledged to have 
been more important than Christians, especially with the rise of the country 
traders bypassing the English East India Company. A century later, with the 
success of the industrial revolution in Britain, the shift was decisive and one 
could speak of capitalist empires in search of markets, primary resources 
and ultimately territorial control. This was certainly truer of Britain than of 
the Netherlands. The greater need to provide and support the factories of 
the former pushed the British to go further than any other trading empire in 
history. This is the story that Nick and his colleagues had to tell. Clearly, there 
were new imperial themes during the nineteenth century that transformed the 
nature of empire in Asia. The British led the way. They took on more onshore 
responsibilities in India and turned the tea and opium trade into casus belli, and 
they dominated the maritime routes through Southeast Asia and subordinated 
the Chinese empire to a different imperial framework.
Economic power was the key, but the shift from commercial ventures 
to industrial needs whether markets, mines or plantations, were not nearly as 
dramatic as what was the really new feature of the empires of the nineteenth 
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century. Nick drew attention to this point in one of his earliest essays, written 
almost fifty years ago, 'The Relationship between British Policies and the 
Extent of Dutch Power in the Malay Peninsula, 1784-1871'.1 I read this 
when I was still freshly under of the influence of Parkinson's majestic two 
volumes, Trade in the Eastern Seas, 1793-1813 and War in the Eastern Seas, 
1793-1815, about the rivalry between the two foundation nation-states of the 
modern world, post-Napoleonic France and Britain. Nick's thesis showed that 
the Dutch nation-state was thereafter adjunct to its larger neighbours and this 
determined the future of its empire in Southeast Asia. What really changed 
was that companies, merchants, wealth and profits were no longer the key 
determinants of power shifts. The consequences of British national victory 
over the French was the emergence of national empires, a model that spread 
the link between empires and national pride and glory to other rising nation-
states in continental Europe and ultimately to the United States of America.
What are national empires? Aren't all empires national? Obviously there 
cannot be such phenomena before the creation of nation-states. For example, it 
would be totally anachronistic if not absurd to describe Sri Vijaya, Majapahit 
or Malacca as national empires; likewise with the Angkor- Khmer, the Siamese 
or the Burmese. The only exception may be the Vietnamese because their 
identity hinged on differentiating themselves from the 'Chinese'. It did not 
matter to them whether Han, Mongol or Manchu elites ruled the larger empire 
to their north. Vietnam survived as what D. G. E. Hall called a proto-national 
state. That, however, did not save them from becoming part of the French 
empire in Asia, and France was the classic national empire, something that 
Asia was only just beginning to encounter.
It is at this point that national imperialism was added to the original 
imperial themes. It not only had its source in industrial capitalism, as J. A. 
Hobson [1858-1940] and V. I. Lenin [1870-1924] were later to argue, but was 
strongly linked to the rising urge to national aggrandizement and ultimately 
to exaggerated claims to political, technological and even cultural and racial 
superiority. I emphasize the 'rising urge' because I do not suggest that this 
was the origin of national empires. Commercial competition was central long 
before national pride and glory became factors in empire building. It was only 
after the end of the eighteenth century that British national ardour to defeat and 
keep out the French, and then the German, the Russian and any other likely 
rivals, became a primary concern. And that was to engage Britain for the next 
150 years. At first, Britain's Indian empire was the challenge, if not the only 
model, for other ambitious powers. But this developed into a British-led battle 
for greater share and control of the markets of China. Soon each European 
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nation-state would join the race to capture as much as possible of that market 
before others arrived. In that context, Southeast Asia seemed to some to have 
become a sub-plot in the imperialist play.
However, Nick has written much on these developments to correct such 
a description. He unfailingly searched the archives to prove that the region 
was never a sub-plot but a key link connecting the new imperial themes of the 
nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. His series of studies 
took us step by step through all the ins and outs of the British Empire at its 
zenith and they have provided much of the evidence we need to show that 
Southeast Asia was a vital part of the globalizing chain of modern empires. In 
so doing, he has also enabled us to read the writings of Eric Hobsbawn, Linda 
Colley and, more recently, Ben Anderson, with specific reference to the model 
of British nation-formation and the changing roles that new projections of 
imperial power played in the politics of the Malay peninsula and archipelago. 
Nick has now followed that up with studies of later British efforts at state 
building and their belated efforts to decolonize the territories under their control 
or protection. The goal was to mould them into nations despite the harsh reality 
of having helped to draw new national borders with little historical validity.
Two of the imperial themes concerning nations becoming empires deserve 
attention. The rich documentation of national empire building is invaluable, 
showing how a maritime trading empire grew to become the world's greatest 
naval power and shaped the British imperial nation. That united and confident 
nation continued to grow almost unchallenged for at least half a century. It set 
high standards of national superiority, the idea that the nation-state was the 
most efficient instrument of imperial power. Some would argue that this also 
led to arrogance and complacency. Then came the challengers all impressed by 
Britain's success and by the efficacy of the nation-state model. Several of these 
sought to become national empires themselves, notably industrial Germany, 
the United States and Japan. Even the large and ponderous Russian empire 
expanded overland towards British spheres of control and influences only 
to be replaced by an even more threatening Soviet power. In short, national 
empires encouraged rivals who were intent on making their own nation-states 
stronger and greater.
The second theme could be framed as a question: will new aspiring 
nation-states have the capacity to be national empires in the post-Cold War 
world? The question has been asked since the European powers began to 
withdraw from their empires in Southeast Asia half a century ago. There was 
a rejuvenated nationalist China followed by a messianic communist China, 
there were international revolutionary movements within Southeast Asia that 
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had attached themselves either to the Soviet Union or to the People's Republic 
of China. Although every nation-state rejected the idea of empire after the end 
of the Second World War, there were no guarantees that some imperial forms 
would not return or new imperial themes could not be invented. The most 
powerful nation-states after that war were the United States and the Russian 
core of the Soviet Union. Although in some eyes, one was benign and the 
other evil, how different were the two from behaving like national empires in 
the deadly rivalry that energized them?
What is at stake is the nature of the international system that was 
predicated on the universal acceptance of nation-states as primary political 
units hereafter. When countries vary so much in size and power, it is difficult 
to believe that the system can ensure equality among nations. The example of 
a Western Europe weary of war and empire could be a catalyst to warn against 
future glorification of old nation-state values, but much more influential is 
the dynamic engine of growth provided by the United States that has already 
transformed East and Southeast Asia and seems willing to do the same 
elsewhere. With the coming rise of China and India, there is more economic 
growth forthcoming. This brings me back to the contrasting experiences that 
Nick and I have been studying. On the one hand, there is the Anglo-American 
model sharing the outgoing European tradition of 'Christians and gold' that had 
opened up the American continent and swept up on the shores of Southeast 
Asia. On the other, there is the populous Chinese example of a former empire 
yet uncertain about the kind of nationstate it expects to become. The former 
now has gold enough to turn attention to a mission of values. The latter still 
has to guard against making the same mistakes that new rising nations had 
made only a few decades ago. My study of Chinese history suggest that the 
lesson has been learnt, that China's acceptance of international norms comes 
not only from national interest but is also influenced by the system of political 
and social values that had shaped its relations with Southeast Asia for more 
than 2000 years.
Southeast Asia's present is still based on how it adjusts to Asia's new 
confidence, how much to retain of its imperial experiences and how much 
it can organize its nation-states to deal with global markets and the national 
powers that could have imperial potential. It is unlikely now that its Asian 
neighbours will follow the nineteenth century European example of national 
aggression or the twentieth century revolutionary impulse to determine the 
regime changes of other nations. There has been enough history written about 
the horrendous disasters of the two centuries to alert the region's leaders to 
cooperate with one another. It is time to consolidate the regional groupings 
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that could protect the region's long-term interests. The imperial themes that 
the region has been through have been varied. Their histories can be conjoined 
to help us outline some future scenarios. I believe Nick's birthday has provided 
us with an opportunity to pool the many fields represented here to reflect our 
present and help construct our future.
NOTES
1 Australian Journal of Politics and History (AJPH), 4, 2 (November 1958), pp. 179-92.
